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"[C]ensorship may not suppress alternative views but 
rather generate them, and, by doing so, undermine its 
own aims." Antoon de Baets (2002, p. 23) 
In the age of instantaneous global communications, overt 
censorship is always a risky endeavor. Attempts to repress 
'dangerous ideas' sometimes have the opposite effect: that is, 
they serve as catalysts for expanding the reach, resonance 
and receptivity of those ideas. 
Judith Levine's book Harmful to Minors (2002), a scholarly 
assessment of U.S. popular views and laws about sexuality, 
came under heavy attack from the right for allegedly 
promoting pedophilia and other evils. Although these 
attacks must have been personally offensive to the author, 
the controversy surrounding the book appears to have 
generated far greater sales for this academic book than 
anyone would [have] anticipated: it rose to number 25 on 
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Amazon.com's bestseller list (Flanders, 2002). 
An alert parent, Jeanne Heifetz, discovered that in recent 
years the New York State Department of Education had 
been systematically bowdlerizing classic literary texts for 
use on the state-wide Regents examinations, which public 
school students are required to take to graduate from high 
school. In a case of political correctness gone mad, the test 
preparers had expunged virtually any mention of race, 
religion, ethnicity, sex, nudity, alcohol, and anything else 
they thought might offend someone for some reason. 
Heifetz took the story to the New York Times, which ran it 
on the front page of its Sunday edition (June 2, 2002) under 
the provocative headline, "The Elderly Man and the Sea? 
Test Sanitizes Literary Texts." Public outrage was 
immediate and vociferous. Writers, publishers, free speech 
groups protested; anti-censorship groups held press 
conferences; late night television comedians reveled in 
parody; and the state's Education Department became the 
laughing stock of the nation for its attempts to correct the 
politics and manners of dead writers. 
During the twilight years of the Soviet Union, censorship 
and exile of Alexandr Solzenitsyn provided the U.S. and its 
allies with a major propaganda victory. The Solzenitsyn 
affair not only exposed the tyranny of the Soviet censorship 
bureaucracy, it cast a global spotlight on the repressive 
character of the entire Soviet system. Solzenitsyn's massive 
three-volume work The Gulag Archipelago (1974, 1975, 
1978) become an international bestseller; moreover, it 
cultivated a market for The Oak and the Calf (1980), an 
exhaustive account of the author's personal struggles with 
the Soviet censors. The Solzenitsyn affair, the house arrest 
of Andrei Sakharov, and the suppression of other dissident 
Soviet intellectuals galvanized internal as well as external 
opposition to the Soviet system. After years of exile in 
America, Solzenitsyn had his [Soviet] citizenship restored in 
1990; he returned to Russia in 1994; and his banned works 
have now been published in his homeland. For a time the 
aging author even hosted a talk show on Russian state 
television; travel agencies now promote tours of Solovetsky 
Island, the site of the gulag (Stanley, 1995; Tsygankov, 
2001). 
These are but a few of many examples that illustrate the 
backfire effect described by Baets: in each case, attempts at 
censorship led to far greater awareness of the target than 
would have occurred without the interventions of censors. 
Of course not all censorship backfires; some forms of 
censorship remain quite effective even in a digital age. The 
interesting question is, why do some censorship efforts 
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backfire while others succeed? 
Answering this question contributes to the advancement of 
freedom of expression by identifying strategies that activists 
can use to resist or counter censorship. To be sure, formal 
legal protections against censorship remain necessary 
cornerstones in all struggles against censorship; however, 
neo-liberalism is rapidly eroding, abridging, and, in some 
instances, eclipsing the effectiveness of the classic free-
expression franchises of the Western liberalism. Justice 
today is neither blind nor swift; and it usually carries very 
high price tags (Moyers, 1999; Soley, 2002). One practical 
defense against attempts to suppress or marginalize 
unpopular views is to develop an understanding of how 
censorship works in order to understand what catalyzes 
backfire. As more people learn how to activate this process, 
overt censorship is less likely to occur; and when it does, it 
is less likely to be effective. 
The literature on censorship is vast, and continues to grow at 
a very rapid pace. Much of it is devoted to history, legal 
analyses, case studies, and theory; however, relatively little 
is aimed at equipping free expression advocates with 
strategies to arm themselves against censorship. Useful 
information can be excavated from between the lines of 
historical and autobiographical accounts of the methods of 
censors; that is presumably one of the reasons why such 
accounts are published retrospectively, for example, 
Nikitenko, The Diary of a Russian Censor (1975) and 
Curry, The Black Book of Polish Censorship (1984). Our 
intent is, however, more direct and proactive: not merely to 
describe censorship, but to identify ways of subverting it. 
We begin by briefly outlining two relevant theoretical 
approaches: one drawn from propaganda studies, the so-
called 'boomerang effect,' and the other drawn from 
nonviolence theory, the concept of 'political jiu-jitsu.' We 
then describe how these concepts can be extended to 
provide insight into how struggles are waged between 
censors and their opponents. We offer three short case 
studies, which illustrate how these dynamics work: the 
McLibel case, the Salman Rushdie case, and recent attempts 
by partisans on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
to limit free exchanges of ideas. We conclude with some 
tentative generalizations. 
  
The boomerang effect and 
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political jiu-jitsu 
Propaganda - the systematic promotion of a particular point 
of view, often through dissemination of selective or false 
information - can be considered a face of censorship, since 
contrary views are hidden or misrepresented. Propaganda, 
like other forms of censorship, sometimes backfires, 
generating antagonism rather than support for the view that 
is being promoted. This has been dubbed "the boomerang 
effect." 
In a kind of double irony, the boomerang concept itself 
boomeranged as it migrated from its origins in U.S. military 
strategy documents into the annuals of critical sociological 
theory and media activism. That is, the boomerang effect, a 
concept developed by the U.S. Government during World 
War II in an effort to ensure production of effective war 
propaganda, created a template that has subsequently been 
useful in criticizing and countering U.S. propaganda. The 
boomerang effect has also gained some traction in critiques 
of corporate propaganda: advertising and public relations. 
In their classic formulation of the boomerang effect, Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton (1949) give four reasons why 
people may respond "inappropriately" to propaganda: (1) 
the authors of the propaganda may misjudge the 
psychological state of the audience; (2) different people 
respond differently to the same message, so some will 
respond negatively; (3) different themes in a piece of 
propaganda may send contrary messages; and (4) people's 
personal experiences may be contrary to what is portrayed 
in propaganda, leading them to reject everything that is said. 
Published after the war, Lazarsfeld and Merton's account of 
war propaganda entered sociological discourse at a juncture 
when there was already a well-established critical literature 
on propaganda analysis. Pioneered by Alfred McClung Lee 
and Dorothy Briant Lee during the 1930s, critical 
propaganda analysis was both a theoretical and activist 
enterprise: an extension of the popular education movement 
spearhead founded by educational reformer John Dewey. 
The Lees sought to arm citizens against propaganda and 
demagoguery by educating them in the "ABCs of 
propaganda analysis;" their explications of the devices or 
"tricks of the trade" that propagandists use to deceive the 
public remain widely respected. Within the post-war 
context, Lazarsfeld and Merton's account was typically read 
and taught as a critical analysis of propaganda, not an 
affirmation of its use. At worst, it was interpreted as the 
work of reluctant propagandists recruited to the service of a 
just war. 
Page 4 of 27Making censorship backfire
5/16/2006http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/03counterpoise.html
"Blowback" is a related term that has been used to describe 
a similar (or the same) dynamic in the realm of policy 
studies. In fact, while U.S. commentators refer to foreign 
policies that have unintended negative domestic 
consequences as blowback, Israelis use boomerang effect to 
describe the same phenomena (Cosmos, 2002). In the U.S. 
context, the term has a strong critical edge; see, for example, 
Simpson (1988) and especially Johnson (2000), whose 
analysis is widely cited by the left to explain Al Qaeda's 
2001 attacks on New York and Washington. 
Nevertheless, critical media and policy analyses remain 
minority and oppositional positions in the U.S. As a result, 
there is a relative paucity of critical studies of government 
or corporate censorship, qua censorship. To our knowledge, 
the boomerang concept has never been directly applied to 
censorship studies. Certainly, no one has systematically 
examined how the backfire dynamic can be deliberately 
used to advance free expression. 
Nonviolence theory offers a more promising theoretical 
entry point, because it is directly oriented to empowerment 
of activists. Consider a group of peaceful protesters who 
come under brutal assault by police. Many of those who 
witness or hear about such an assault respond with outrage, 
generating more support for the protesters and weakening 
resolve among the police. For example, in 1998 Indonesian 
students were active in protesting against dictatorial ruler 
Suharto. On May 4th at Trisakti University, police opened 
fire, killing four students and two others. Rather than 
deterring protest, the killings generated enormous outrage 
and overnight escalated the scale of protest immensely. This 
was the turning point in the struggle that led to Suharto's 
resignation. 
In order for violence to backfire, it is vital that protesters are 
not violent themselves. If there is perceived to be violence 
on both sides, no matter how imbalanced, observers are less 
likely to identify with protesters, even if they perceive their 
cause as just. This is the reason that police try to provoke 
protesters or use agents provocateurs to foment violence. If 
even a few protesters are violent, violence against protest 
movements is seen as more legitimate. 
For violence against peaceful protesters to backfire, it is 
necessary for others to be aware of what is happening. In 
1930 in India, Gandhi led a march to the sea with the intent 
of making salt, which was in violation of the British 
monopoly. At the culmination of the march, many 
satyagrahis - nonviolent activists - submitted without 
resistance to brutal beatings by the police, with many of the 
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satyagrahis sustaining serious injuries. British authorities 
claimed that the protesters were faking their injuries. But 
U.S. journalist Webb Miller independently reported the 
events, helping to change opinion in Britain and the United 
States. Gandhi's tactics generated massive support in India, 
weakened British colonial resolve and garnered support 
from third parties (Dalton, 1993; Weber, 1993). 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and his associates consciously used 
Gandhi's nonviolent tactics to model their leadership of the 
U.S. civil rights movement during the 1960s. Participants in 
civil rights marches were instructed not to retaliate even in 
the face of overwhelming police brutality. The quiet dignity 
of the black protesters, chronicled on the network television 
news programs, evoked great public sympathy among both 
blacks and whites while representations of the ignorance and 
cruelty of Southern law enforcement officers like Bull 
Conner incited revulsion, especially in the heavily populated 
Northern and Western states. Nonviolence cultivated 
sympathy among the eye-witness observers in the press, 
who, in turn, created and disseminated sympathetic images 
and narrative accounts of the struggles against segregation 
in the South. Police violence helped to turn the tide of public 
opinion against racial injustice. Conversely, white support 
for the movement ebbed significantly after King's murder 
when some black militant and black power advocates 
espoused violent tactics, and images of rioting, burning, and 
looting of businesses in ghetto neighborhoods of major U.S. 
cities became part of the nightly television news reports 
(Branch, 1989, 1999). 
In November 1991 in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East 
Timor, hundreds of peaceful mourners were killed by 
Indonesian troops. Western journalist Max Stahl recorded 
the massacre on videotape and smuggled it out of the 
country; when broadcast on television internationally, 
images of the atrocities galvanized support for the East 
Timorese liberation struggle (Kohen, 1999, pp. 160-187). 
On a lesser scale, the same process can be seen in the 
beating of Rodney King, which rebounded against the Los 
Angeles police. Although there are numerous reports of 
police beatings, the assault on King was captured on 
videotape, making police denial far more difficult to sustain. 
Gene Sharp, the world's leading nonviolence researcher, 
coined the term "political jiu-jitsu" for the process by which 
violent attack on nonviolent activists can backfire. As in the 
sport of jiu-jitsu, the strength of the attacker is turned to 
their disadvantage. Sharp (1973) documented nearly 200 
different methods of nonviolent action, for example 
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petitions, banners, mock awards, protest disrobings, 
motorcades, teach-ins, social boycotts, sanctuary, peasant 
strikes, prisoners' strikes, boycotts of elections, sit-ins, 
guerrilla theater, selective patronage and alternative 
markets. Political jiu-jitsu is part of what Sharp calls the 
dynamics of nonviolent action, whose typical steps include 
(1) laying the groundwork, (2) challenge that brings 
repression, (3) solidarity and discipline in the face of 
repression, (4) political jiu-jitsu, and (5) redistribution of 
power. Sharp's framework is based on examination of large 
numbers of struggles; political jiu-jitsu describes a process 
that has been frequently observed in history. For example, 
South African police on March 21, 1960 opened fire, 
without warning, on black protesters, killing a number of 
them; this event, called the "Sharpeville massacre," 
triggered outrage across the world, leading to sanctions and 
greatly increased support for opponents of apartheid. 
The idea of political jiu-jitsu can readily be applied to 
struggles against censorship. Sharp divides nonviolent 
action into three general categories: protest and persuasion; 
noncooperation (such as strikes and boycotts); and 
intervention (such as sit-ins). Many of the methods of 
protest and persuasion are the simple exercise of free 
speech, such as signed public statements, banners, 
skywriting, symbolic lights, and skits. Nonviolent action is 
defined as action that goes beyond ordinary political action 
such as voting or handing out leaflets; a public speech is a 
routine event in many countries but in a dictatorship it 
would count as nonviolent action. Whether or not an action 
is labeled "nonviolent," the process of political jiu-jitsu can 
occur. 
Within Sharp's framework, writing and publishing would 
ordinarily be viewed as routine exercises of free speech in 
liberal or post-liberal societies. They rise to the level of 
nonviolent action when censors, with or without credentials, 
intervene in these exercises either prior to or after a creative 
work enters the public sphere. Under such conditions, 
political jiu-jitsu may occur in reaction to censorship. 
What are the keys to triggering political jiu-jitsu? Sharp 
does not give a precise answer, but some elements in the 
causal chain can be inferred. First, there is repulsion against 
violence in itself. Second, there is a sense of injustice, as 
when people are physically assaulted even though they have 
not caused harm to anyone else. Or the injustice may be 
manifest in flagrant discrepancies between official policies 
and corrupt practices. Third, there is a marked disproportion 
between an act - a peaceful protest - and the response to it, a 
major assault. In the Sharpeville massacre, some protesters 
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threw stones (without causing serious injury); lethal force by 
the police was seen as an excessive response. Sharp (1973, 
p. 660) points out that, "The extreme disproportion between 
the repression and the demonstrators' behavior shocked 
world opinion." 
The same elements are present when censorship backfires. 
Some observers are repulsed by the very fact of censorship. 
Others are incensed by the injustice involved. Still others 
respond to the disproportion between the acts - speaking, 
writing, publishing, or creating works of art - and the heavy-
handed responses of those who would suppress these acts. 
Most censors know that censorship can backfire. There are 
many strategies that they use to inhibit or prevent backfire. 
The first and most obvious method is to try to reduce 
awareness that censorship has occurred: that is, censors 
censor the fact of censorship. As in Orwell's 1984, the 
rewriting of history is most effective when carried out in 
secrecy. For example, when controversial works are 
submitted to book publishers or film producers, it is easy to 
reject them on the grounds that they are not of sufficient 
caliber or that they will not sell. "Market censorship" (which 
virually never operates under its own name) is considered a 
legitimate form of censorship in capitalist societies - just 
good business! Authors of works rejected as unworthy or 
unprofitable are expected to accept their failure without 
complaint. If an author is too prominent to be silenced this 
way, a publisher may publish the book but privately ensure 
that it disappears leaving few traces. Publishers in the U.S. 
call this "privishing:" it is a tactic used "to kill off a book 
that, for one reason or another, is considered 'troublesome' 
or potentially so" (Colby, 2002, p. 16). Publishers do this by 
cutting off the book's support system: reducing the initial 
print run so it cannot make a profit, providing little or no 
advertising, failing to send out review copies, and canceling 
promotional tours. 
Another way to censor the existence of censorship is 
through threats, such as threatening to sue for defamation, 
which may lead the writer to self-censor or the publisher to 
bypass a book as too hot to handle. Many court settlements 
of whistleblower cases include so-called gagging clauses, 
enjoining all parties to say nothing about the details of the 
settlement, including the existence of the non-disclosure 
clause. Such clauses are typically imposed by the employer 
as a condition of the settlement. Threats can be implicit too, 
as when a scientist is instructed by the boss not to present a 
paper to a conference, or to remove sensitive comments; the 
implication is that refusal would lead to more serious 
measures. 
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To counter censorship of censorship, there are two key 
components: documentation and publicity. Documentation 
of the existence of censorship is essential, otherwise there is 
little prospect of convincing anyone that censorship has 
occurred. Without adequate evidence, claims of censorship 
can be counterproductive, rebounding on the credibility of 
the claimant. In many cases collecting evidence is difficult, 
time-consuming or risky. Direct evidence may be 
impossible to obtain, especially since the censor is bound to 
cloak actions in legitimate terms and often believes in the 
rationalizations offered. One way to reveal censorship is to 
expose double standards. For example, CNN, which 
routinely airs issue-oriented advertising, refused to accept 
advertisements from non-profit groups opposing passage by 
the U.S. Congress of the 1996 omnibus 
Telecommunications Act. Similarly, other U.S. media 
outlets systematically ignored or undercovered debates 
about the bill, which was written at the behest of lobbyists 
for major media and telecommunication conglomerates. 
Activists, using alternative media, exposed the double-
standards, but the bill passed. 
The second key component is publicity: a wider audience 
must be informed about the censorship in order to mobilize 
support. As in Gandhi's salt march or the Rodney King 
beating, the combination of documentation and publicity 
provide a powerful way of overcoming censorship of 
censorship. Authors who already have some visibility can 
sometimes use the mainstream media as a bully pulpit to 
make their case; less well-known figures can use alternative 
media or the internet to publicize their grievances. Western 
supporters of Solzenitsyn, Sakharov, Pasternack and other 
Soviet dissidents successfully used the ideological climate 
of the Cold War to advance their work. Authors with strong 
cases can appeal to anti-censorship groups, librarians' 
associations, and professional organizations in their 
particular areas of expertise for support. Attaching a 
censorship case to established political causes can also 
work. An author whose manuscript is considered potentially 
'troublesome' because, for example, it contains damaging 
information about the use of growth hormones in beef 
production might align him or herself with campaigns 
against breast cancer or for the environment. 
Another standard method for justifying censorship is 
attacking the censored. For example, a censored author 
might be castigated as incompetent, immoral, disloyal, 
unreliable, unstable, paranoid, or greedy. No work is ever 
perfect; a trivial error, perhaps even the work of a careless 
typographer or editor, may be used as a rationale for 
discrediting an entire book. In some countries, censored 
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authors and journalists are imprisoned, tortured, or killed. 
Some attacks are directed against individuals, such as 
denigration of Noam Chomsky, whose books, articles, and 
talks are largely excluded from the mainstream U.S. media 
(Croteau and Hoynes, 1994). Other attacks are generic, such 
as media scapegoating of prisoners, homeless people, 
anarchists, or drug addicts, while providing little or no 
opportunity for representatives of these groups to express 
their viewpoints in mainstream forums. 
An effective response to attacks is valorization of the 
censored, for example through documentation of quality, 
evidence of good intentions, and endorsements from valued 
sources. To counter attacks on a banned artist, it can help to 
show previous favorable responses to the artist's work, 
prizes received, endorsements by other artists, and evidence 
of modest income or charity towards others. It is unfair, but 
those who are censored are frequently held to a higher 
standard of behavior than are others. The reality of political 
jiu-jitsu is that nonviolent activists are expected to behave 
far better than those who assault them: the slightest 
breakdown in nonviolent discipline or evidence of self-
seeking behavior can be used to discredit an entire 
movement. Likewise, those who complain about censorship 
are often expected to be without blemish. Those who intend 
to push boundaries should expect this sort of treatment and 
be prepared. Nevertheless, living a flawless life is no 
guarantee against personal attack: misrepresentations, 
circulation of rumors, and manufacturing of evidence are 
grist for the mills of censors. 
Personal attacks can backfire. By revealing the attacks and 
proving that they are groundless, the victim of the attack can 
mobilize greater support. In responding to attacks, however, 
it is usually better to avoid the temptation to counterattack. 
Like violent retaliation, verbal retaliation or, even worse, 
attempts to censor the censor, surrender the high moral 
ground that those who have been unfairly attacked occupy: 
it can open the victim up to the charge of holding double 
standards. 
The backfire effect can also be stopped or reversed if a 
victim resorts to formal procedures such as grievance 
hearings or litigation. An employer can claim that due 
process was followed in dismissing an employee, even if the 
dismissal occurred immediately after the employee had 
released documents about corporate malfeasance to an 
outside auditor, thereby challenging one of the most 
pervasive forms of censorship, the legal or de facto ban on 
employees revealing on-the-job information to outsiders. If 
the employee decides to fight the dismissal in court, it is an 
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unequal battle, since the corporation has far more money 
and time to wage the case. Yet many people see official 
channels - grievance procedures, auditors, ombudsmen, 
courts, Congressional committees - as balanced venues for 
seeking the truth. Therefore, once the matter enters such 
channels, the prospects for invoking political jiu-jitsu are 
minimal. 
Dissidents are often encouraged to use official channels. In 
the US, where television shows give the illusion that justice 
is regularly and swiftly dispensed, courts are often an 
avenue of first resort. Whistleblower laws encourage 
disclosures to official bodies but not to the media, though 
official bodies are quite unlikely to help and media exposure 
is widely known to be more effective (De Maria, 1999; 
Devine, 1997). Views may differ about the value of using 
official channels. If, however, the primary goal is to invoke 
political jiu-jitsu, then official channel should usually be 
avoided or used strategically as forums for gaining wider 
publicity about the injustice the plaintiff has suffered. Our 
first case study illustrates how this kind of strategic use of 
the courts worked effectively in a famous recent struggle 
between two determined Davids and a corporate Goliath. 
  
McLibel: a defamation suit 
backfires 
London Greenpeace is a small anarchist group independent 
of the well-known environmental organization Greenpeace 
International. In the 1980s, London Greenpeace produced a 
leaflet called "What's wrong with McDonald's?" which 
criticized, among other things, the nutritional value of 
McDonald's food, the wages and working conditions of 
employees, and the clearing of rainforest for beef 
production. 
McDonald's management had long taken a strongly 
proprietary stance in regard to its name - for example suing 
pre-existing family restaurants named McDonald's - and 
taking aggressive action towards critics (Donson, 2000). 
The company hired spies to infiltrate London Greenpeace. It 
collected evidence and sued five individuals for defamation. 
(It should be noted that British defamation law is much 
harsher than U.S. law (Hooper, 2000).) Three of the targets 
of the suit decided to withdraw, but two - gardener Helen 
Steel and postman Dave Morris - chose to fight the case. 
With little money, they ran the case themselves, learning the 
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law as they went along. The case ended up being the longest 
running legal action in British history. McDonald's won the 
case: the judge ruled that some claims in the leaflet were 
false and awarded £60,000 against Steel and Morris (they 
have appealed). But for McDonald's, it was a public 
relations disaster. Steel and Morris's defense generated 
enormous sympathy, enabling them to obtain some free 
legal advice and to call many witnesses at no cost to them. 
The judge ruled that many of the damaging claims in the 
leaflet had been proved true. More importantly, the case 
generated enormous publicity, almost all of it hostile to 
McDonald's. Worse still for McDonald's, supporters set up a 
website called McSpotlight that grew like topsy and soon 
contained masses of information critical of McDonald's. As 
a consequence of all this activity, the original leaflet, 
"What's wrong with McDonald's?" was read by millions of 
people, far more than if McDonald's had ignored London 
Greenpeace entirely. The case, commonly called McLibel 
(Vidal, 1997), has become an object lesson to other 
corporations on the dangers of suing critics. 
The McLibel case illustrates how censorship can backfire. 
McDonald's sought to censor its critics through the threat of 
defamation action. This certainly had the potential for a jiu-
jitsu effect, given that the response by McDonald's was 
grossly disproportionate to the action by London 
Greenpeace: a high-powered lawsuit to stop limited 
circulation of a leaflet by an obscure anarchist group. If 
everyone in London Greenpeace had acquiesced, then only a 
limited number of activists and supporters would have 
known about McDonald's attempt to suppress criticism - 
probably about as many people as had received the original 
leaflet. By refusing to succumb, Steel and Morris took the 
essential first step in making the censorship backfire. 
The second essential step was making people aware of the 
attack. In tandem with their legal efforts, Steel, Morris, and 
their supporters publicized the case. We have argued that 
official channels can serve censors; if Steel and Morris had 
just gone to court without wider publicity, this would not 
have been very damaging to McDonald's. Instead, McLibel 
campaigners used the court process as the springboard for 
publicity, making every legal step a negative for 
McDonald's. Indeed, McDonald's sought to settle the case 
on a number of occasions but Steel and Morris refused to 
compromise on key points. 
As members of an anarchist group, Steel and Morris might 
seem obvious targets for denigration. What seems to have 
protected them from attack was their commitment to 
principle: they challenged McDonald's on substantive 
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grounds - the matters in the leaflet - and grounds of free 
speech. There is no evidence that they tried to benefit 
personally from the case, for example to obtain money from 
the media - if they had, this could easily have been used 
against them. By sticking to their working class roles, they 
emphasized the disproportionality between the rich, 
powerful, and unscrupulous attackers and the poor yet 
principled defenders. 
It is important to note that Steel and Morris did not achieve 
this on their own. The efforts of numerous supporters were 
essential to making McDonald's legal action so 
counterproductive. Mobilization of support is a key to 
making censorship backfire. 
  
The Satanic Verses: book 
censorship backfires 
Publicity is a powerful means of triggering backlash, and 
publicity in censorship cases is relatively easy to generate if 
certain preconditions are met. First, the censored writer is 
well established, well networked, or championed by 
someone who is; that is, the writer can be presented to the 
media as creditable, with a meritorious case. Second, the 
cause celebre resonates in positive ways with larger 
ideological agendas or with the perceived interests of media 
organizations and/or the professional values of journalists. 
No recent attempt at book censorship has received as much 
global publicity as the case of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic 
Verses. The story began in India when a Muslim member of 
Parliament, Syed Shahabuddin, who admitted he had not 
read Rushdie's book, petitioned the government of Rajvi 
Gandhi to ban the novel on the grounds of blasphemy. The 
Indian Government, sensitive to religious conflict, issued a 
ban on October 5, 1988. After Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
and South Africa quickly followed suit, black marketed 
copies of the forbidden fruit were soon doing brisk business 
in the underground literary markets of all of those countries. 
Conservative interests in Pakistan escalated the affair by 
demanding that newly elected, Western educated, Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto force the United States to halt its 
publication of The Satanic Verses. When this ill-fated 
venture failed, anti-American riots broke out in Pakistan. 
The Pakistani fundamentalists then turned to Iran for help. 
In addition to irreverent, satirical, and salacious references 
to Islam, The Satanic Verses contained a thinly disguised 
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portrayal of Ayatollah Khomeini, which represented him as 
the mouth of hell devouring his people. The Ayatollah was 
therefore highly receptive to the Pakistanis' appeals. 
The Fatwa issued by Khomeini and the Iranian Government 
in February 1989 condemned the author of The Santanic 
Verses to death: any editors or publishers who were aware 
of the book's contents but knowingly participated in the 
project were also included in the death sentence. Moreover, 
Khomeini called on "all zealous Muslims to execute them 
quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will dare to 
insult the Islamic sanctions. Whoever is killed on this path 
will be regarded as a martyr, God willing" (Khomeini in 
Appignanesi and Maitland, 1990, p. 68). A million-dollar 
reward was offered for Rushdie's assassination, a bounty 
that was doubled in 1997. The Indian-born Rushdie was a 
naturalized citizen of the United Kingdom living in England 
at the time the Fatwa was issued; the death threat forced him 
into hiding for a decade. 
In 1990, Rushdie published an essay, "In Good Faith," in 
which he apologized and professed his respect for Islam; but 
the Fatwa remained in effect. The Italian translator of The 
Satanic Verses, Ettore Capriolo, was wounded in an 
attempted assassination in Milan in 1991; and a week later, 
Hitoshi Igarishi, the Japanese translator, was stabbed to 
death in Tokyo. In 1993, William Nygaard, the book's 
Norwegian publisher, was shot and severely wounded 
outside of his Oslo home. Violent protests over the book in 
India, Pakistan, and Egypt also caused several deaths. The 
Fatwa was repealed by the Iranian Government in 1998. It 
was, however, reissued by an Iranian state prosecutor, 
Morteza Moqtadale; and, at that time, Ayatollah Hassan 
Sanier promised a reward of $2.8 million. In February 2003, 
Iran's elite fighting force, the Revolutionary Guards, re-
ignited the controversy by renewing the call for Rushdie's 
death; and Ayatollah Sanier raised the bounty to $3 million. 
While reformist and independent newspapers ignored the 
14th anniversary of the edict, the February 14, 2003 issue of 
the hard-line Jomhuri Islami featured a 16-page supplement 
on the Rushdie case with a front-page cartoon of the corpse 
of Rushdie in a coffin draped with the flags of the United 
States, Britain, and Israel - countries seen as supporter's of 
Rushdie's work (Dareini, 2003). 
The Rushdie case was unprecedented; it was the first time 
any state has ever publicly announced its intention to kill a 
citizen of another country for a crime of ideas, as well as 
anyone associated with the publication of those ideas. 
Moreover, by authorizing and, in effect, deputizing all 
Moslems to carry out the death sentence without regard to 
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the sovereignty of the nation in which the execution might 
take place, the Fatwa was in flagrant violation of 
international law and of international human rights accords 
(D'Souza, 1995). 
International response to the Fatwa were immediate, 
extensive, and multi-faceted: protests were issued by the 
British and U.S. governments and the European Union; 
international human rights and freedom of expression 
groups like Article 19, Writers and Scholars International, 
and P.E.N. championed the case; the Western press 
expressed outrage and kept the media spotlight on the 
Rushdie case for years; and prominent authors and other 
public figures spoke and wrote eloquent pleas on Rushdie's 
behalf. Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. 
Intense international diplomatic pressure was put on the 
Iranian Government; this pressure eventually prevailed even 
though religious hard liners refused to recognize the Iranian 
Government's official lifting of the Fatwa. 
For our purposes, the complex backfire the Rushdie case 
produced is particularly instructive because: (a) it raises 
questions about what qualifies as successful political jiu-
jitsu in censorship cases; and (b) it emphasizes the 
importance of context in launching and assessing political 
jiu-jitsu. Viewed from a Western perspective, the Fatwa 
against Rushdie failed. Without the Fatwa, The Satanic 
Verses would have been published without fanfare, received 
mixed reviews, and would have been largely forgotten by 
now. Instead the book became an international bestseller; 
and its author, for a time, became a household name even 
among people who do not read books (Shapiro, 1989). The 
Rushdie case was a shining moment for many defenders of 
free expression including the European Union, Article 19, 
P.E.N., Writers and Scholars International (publishers of the 
influential London-based of Index on Censorship), the 
American Library Association, among other organizations 
and individuals. 
Rushdie himself became a virtual captive of the British 
Government, which provided him with safe houses and 
round-the-clock guards until he moved to the United States 
in 2000. Rushdie reports that he suffered from depression 
during his decade underground and that his marriage broke 
under the strain. Yet, he continued to write and publish. 
Even by his own assessment, however, his bitter sojourn has 
been a triumph, albeit a dark one: as he puts it, "To live, to 
avoid assassination, is a greater victory than to be 
murdered" (quoted by McNamee, 1999, p. 5). 
Nevertheless the Rushdie case revealed some significant 
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fissures in the West's own support for freedom of 
expression. Perhaps most striking was the cowardly stance 
taken by chain bookstores, which typically portray 
themselves as frontal troops in battles against censorship. 
W.H. Smith, England's primary chain, withdrew the book 
from some of its stores after a ritual book burning in a 
Moslem neighborhood and fire bombings of some stores. 
However, the U.S.'s major chains - Waldenbook, B. Dalton, 
and Barnes and Noble - went much further. They pulled the 
book from their shelves citing fears of terrorism, thereby 
demonstrating that corporate conglomerates cannot always 
be relied upon in censorship battles even when there is high 
consumer demand. Several European publishers also 
canceled their editions of the book, although most 
subsequently reversed their decisions. 
Politicians also proved to be uncertain allies. Many political 
figures tempered their defenses of freedom of expression 
with qualifications; some condemned the book while 
defending its right to be published, whereas others agreed 
that it was blasphemous and suggested it should not be read. 
Canada, a liberal, book-loving democracy, began banning 
procedures on the grounds that The Satanic Verses was hate 
literature, only abandoning the effort because the book did 
not meet the law's terms. 
Newspapers were more reliable supporters, joining writers 
and other intellectuals in exposing the book chains' 
collective failure of nerve. The American Librarian 
Association protested against the Fatwa and the book chains' 
self-censorship. Librarians across the U.S. resisted pressures 
to remove the book from circulation, with some taking extra 
measures, including ordering more copies than usual, to 
ensure that the book would be available to readers. Other 
intellectual and cultural institutions, with few exceptions, 
also proved to be staunch opponents of censorship: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for example, 
named Rushdie an honorary visiting professor, an honor that 
the university had only conferred four other times in its 
history. 
Viewed from a radical Islamic perspective, however, it can 
be argued that the Fatwa also succeeded to a significant 
degree even though Rushdie survived and continued to 
publish. Rushdie did apologize for writing The Satanic 
Verses. A translator was executed. The book was in fact 
banned in many countries throughout the world. Two 
Muslim leaders in Belgium, who opposed Rushdie's death 
penalty, were murdered. Many non-Moslems agreed that the 
book was immoral and blasphemous. Radical Islam has 
continued its rapid growth; and the Fatwa against Rushdie 
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helped draw, reinforce, and widely publicize the lines that 
separate the Muslim world from the secular values of the 
West. The stern discipline of radical Islam was modeled for 
its growing population of youthful followers; and the 
sacrosanct status of the Qu'ran was defended. Khomeini 
himself considered the Rushdie affair a success, claiming 
that it had saved Iran "from a naïve foreign policy" (Watson, 
1989). 
What lessons can activists learn from the Rushdie case? 
First, success and failure are 'both/and' terms rather than 
mutually exclusive categories. Both sides won and lost some 
ground in the Rushdie affair. In highly polarized contexts, 
partial victories are sometimes all that are possible. 
Second, when feasible - and it is often not in censorship 
cases - activists should select their fights carefully. Despite 
the praise of some world class literary figures, The Satanic 
Verses and Salman Rushdie were not the ideal candidates 
for valorization. That is, Rushdie does not stand on the kind 
of high moral ground that Solzenitsyn occupied during the 
Cold War. There are many thoughtful people who 
campaigned against censorship of The Satanic Verses who 
did not like the book or admire its author. Remember even 
Rushdie apologized for the book. There are other writers 
who have been targets of death threats by radical Muslims in 
recent years whose cases might have generated more 
unconditional support in the West; yet, these cases have 
received little or no press in mainstream media. An example 
is the Bangladeshi novelist Taslima Nasrin, who was 
sentenced to death in 1994 for advocating the emancipation 
of Muslim women and greater religious tolerance 
(McNamee, 1999, p. 5). 
Third, it is usually easier to rally positive media support for 
cases of book or other forms of media censorship than for 
other kinds of dissidence, protest movements or 
whistleblowing. The reasons for this will be examined more 
fully in the concluding section of the paper. Suffice to say 
here that common membership in the fraternity of print 
makes a writer who is censored, no matter how abhorrent 
his or her views, a kindred spirit; whereas other dissenters, 
no matter how just their causes, are routinely viewed with 
professional skepticism by journalists. Rushdie certainly 
benefited from membership in this fraternity. Moreover, the 
obsession with celebrity that migrated from the tabloids to 
the mainstream press in the early 1980s added cache to 
Rushdie's case. The Fatwa made him famous; and his fame 
made him a celebrity, whose surprise appearances at glitzy 
London parties (which he wouldn't have been invited to 
before The Satanic Verses furor) endowed Rushdie sightings 
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with high news and cash value. In sum, understanding the 
professional ideology of the press, news values, and the 
economic and social structures of media organizations is an 
indispensable asset in gaining support from the press that 
can contribute to making censorship backfire. 
  
Middle East Conflict: boycotts 
and blacklists of scholars 
backfire 
The political conflict in the Middle East has recently incited 
attempts by partisans on both sides of the hostilities to 
censor, boycott, or blacklist scholars and their scholarship. 
While all of the reverberations of these efforts cannot yet be 
measured, it is clear that they have incited significant 
backfire that has damaged partisans on both sides. The 
academic boycotts are frequently referred to in the singular; 
however, there were actually two, one initiated by Oxford 
professors Colin Blakemore and Richard Dawkins and the 
other by [Bradford University's Hilary Rose and the Open 
University's Steven Rose], mounted on a joint web-site 
(www.pipo.org). The boycotts became world news on April 
6, 2002 when The Guardian (London) published a letter 
signed by 120 university scholars, primarily mathematicians 
and scientists, calling for a boycott of research and cultural 
links with Israel by the European Union and the European 
Science Foundation until Israel abides by United Nations 
resolutions and opens serious peace negotiations with the 
Palestinians. The petition was subsequently signed by many 
more scholars (almost 300 by May 17th) including some 
Israelis. A fierce debate ensued: the categorical 
condemnation of all Israeli scholars invited and quickly 
received charges of anti-Semitism. The controversy 
escalated further when two Israeli scholars, Gideon Toury of 
Tel Aviv University and Miriam Schlesinger of Bar-Llan 
University, were dismissed from the editorial boards of 
academic journals owned by Mona Baker of the University 
of Manchester, who said she was honoring the boycott after 
long and painful soul-searching reflection. Schlesinger's 
case was particularly newsworthy because she is a former 
chair of Israel's chapter of Amnesty International and a critic 
of Israel's policies in Gaza and the West Bank. 
Leonid Ryzhik, a Russian-born University of Chicago 
mathematician, organized a counter-movement, "Don't 
boycott Israel," launched a web-site (www.anti-boycott-
petition.org), and posted 2,200 signatures, including two 
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Nobel Prize winners. The Ryzhik petition, which was also 
published by The Guardian (May 22, 2002), described the 
British petition as "immoral, dangerous and misguided" and 
claimed that it "indirectly encourages the terrorist murderers 
in their deadly deeds." The EU commissioner for research, 
Philippe Busquin, dismissed the British-organized petitions 
calling for the academic boycott as "counter-productive," 
citing scientific cooperation as a means of encouraging 
dialog and negotiations in the Middle East (The Guardian, 
May 27, 2002). Some of the signers of the call for the 
academic boycott (including Dawkins) subsequently 
withdrew their signatures from the original petitions. Yet, 
Dr. Aaron Benavot of Hebrew University, who also 
organized a counter-boycott petition, reports that there is 
anecdotal evidence that the academic boycott is having an 
effect (The Telegraph, May 16, 2002). 
The very idea of boycotts in matters of the mind struck 
critics, including some who oppose Israeli policy, as 
untenable because they run counter to the professed norms 
of academic freedom and scientific inquiry. One 
consequence of the backfire generated by the calls for 
academic boycotts of the Israelis is that they have made it 
far more difficult to articulate and publish legitimate 
criticisms of individual Israeli scholars and think tanks that 
do actually function as propagandists for Israeli policy. 
In a more recent case, Middle East scholars in the U.S. were 
targeted by a pro-Israeli, Philadelphia-based think tank, the 
Middle East Forum, which set up a web-site, "Campus 
Watch" (www.campuswatch.org), and posted dossiers on 
eight Middle Eastern studies professors because of their 
views on Palestine and Islam. Calling these scholars 
"hostile" to America, the web-site asks readers to report 
other Middle East lectures, classes, and demonstrations to 
the Forum's director, Daniel Pipes of the University of 
Pennsylvania. Those listed on the site have been reportedly 
received thousands of threatening and racist emails; and 
they have been put in the position of having to defend their 
intellectual integrity to the press as well as to their Jewish 
students. 
The site has, however, generated a nation-wide backlash. 
Protesting against what they characterize as "blacklisting," 
hundreds of scholars have attempted to "turn themselves in" 
to the Forum in an organized act of solidarity with the eight 
scholars. Led by colorful University of California at 
Berkeley scholar Judith Butler, who is herself Jewish, the 
protest has migrated from the web to the mainstream press 
where Butler's message - that there is "a very fundamental 
mistake in assuming that any position critical of 
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contemporary Israeli policy is anti-Semitic" - has reached 
far beyond the academic audience originally targeted by the 
web-site (San Francisco Chronicle, September 28, 2002). 
It is an inconvenient fact of history that academics and 
intellectuals, despite their professed commitments to 
academic freedom and open inquiry, have often included 
individuals and groups who have been as eager as tyrants to 
silence opposing views. This is as understandable as it is 
lamentable. No one has more passionate attachments to or 
deeper investments in securing the futures of particular 
ideas, theories, and paradigms than their authors; and no one 
is more tenacious in rooting out, exposing, and condemning 
what they sincerely regard as wrong-headed, inaccurate, or 
dangerous ideas than scholars or intellectuals who hold 
opposing views. However, given the fact that free and open 
critical exchange of ideas is a constituent principle of post-
Enlightenment secular scholarship, those scholars and 
intellectuals who move beyond vigorous criticism of 
adversarial views to advocating boycotts or blacklists have 
no moral ground to stand on. Boycotts or blacklists in 
matters of mind invite and deserve backfire. Boycotts do, of 
course, remain useful tactics in the David and Goliath 
struggles in campaigns for justice in which grassroots 
organizations find themselves pitted against the staggering 
resources of governments and large corporations. 
  
Conclusion 
An examination of cases where censorship backfires 
provides some valuable lessons in how to make this happen. 
The first important point is that the censorship should be 
exposed to audiences who will be outraged by the act of 
censorship itself or by the disproportion between the act 
(speaking out) and the censoring response (a heavy-handed 
attack). It is essential to have solid documentation, which 
means that only some cases of censorship can be exposed in 
this way. 
It is important not to be intimidated. Censorship is often 
backed up by threats of what will happen if those who are 
censored do not acquiesce. It can be rewarding to see these 
threats as potential opportunities. By exposing the threats, 
the backlash can be made all the stronger. 
Targets of censorship need to be prepared for further attack - 
including personal invective - should they challenge the 
censorship. Once again, it is important not to be intimidated, 
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because personal attacks can be made to backfire too. When 
coming under fierce attack, the first instinct of many people 
is to retreat, but a better response - both tactically and 
psychologically - can be to expose the unfairness of the 
attack. 
The cases where the backfire effect has worked best have 
been in the public sphere, where appeals can be made 
directly to substantial audiences. When censorship is 
challenged by using an official channel - a grievance 
procedure or a court - then it is much harder to mobilize 
support. Steel and Morris responded to McDonald's use of 
defamation law by fighting a court case, but their real 
victory occurred through extensive publicity. Rushdie 
apologized, hoping to terminate the Fatwa through the 
channels it had arisen, but this was unsuccessful. It was 
massive publicity that turned the tide in his favor. In 
challenging the boycotts and blacklists of scholars, publicity 
again has been the key. Complaints to professional 
associations would have been too little and too late. 
Making censorship backfire is not a task for the faint-
hearted. It can require great energy and staying power, plus 
the psychological strength to survive personal attacks. The 
positive side is the support received from others, which can 
make all the difference. In order for censorship to backfire, 
lots of people need to express their concern. Those who 
have come under attack and survived often say that 
expressions of support kept them going. In this we all have a 
role to play. 
  
Appendix: Tips on dealing with 
the press 
Activists seeking to trigger backfire by valorizing victims in 
the press require a basic knowledge of the work routines of 
news organizations. They need to be aware of how the daily 
press cycles work in print and electronic media (Jensen, 
2001). For example, if activists want their cause covered by 
a daily newspaper that is published in morning editions, they 
need to know that reporters are much more likely to take 
their phone calls and listen to their pitches early the 
preceding day. Similarly, they need to be constantly and 
acutely aware of the time pressures all news people work 
under. They need to cultivate good rapport with journalists: 
a cardinal rule in this regard is not to waste the journalist's 
time. 
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Prepare well in advance of making contact with journalists: 
gather the facts for the journalist and do so using the 
rhetoric of objectivity that journalists recognize and 
consider credible. That is, cite facts using recognized 
sources, e.g. statistics or citations from human rights 
organizations, or endorsements of the victim's worthiness 
from respected individuals or organizations. Present these 
facts in clear and concise form; ideally in a one-page press 
release that answers the standard journalistic repertoire of 
questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how (Jensen, 
2001). Well-written press releases submitted to newspapers 
from credible sources at appropriate times during the daily 
news cycle frequently appear in newspapers with only 
moderate editing; in effect, they can function as free 
advertising. But remember in many countries, especially the 
U.S., all controversial stories must be vetted by lawyers 
before they are published. Weekly publications, magazines, 
journals, and newspaper supplements are, in many cases, 
better outlets for such stories because the journalist has a 
longer lead time to investigate the story, establish the 
subject's credibility, and to clear publication with his or her 
supervisors. Alternative media, web-sites, and specialized 
publications like Index on Censorship are good places to 
start since they now frequently are pipelines that feed 
mainstream media. In dealing with electronic media, the 
message must be reduced to two or three sound bites: they 
must be dramatic and pithy, yet delivered in the cool 
modulations that television and radio demand. With 
television, visuals are also a must. 
In cases of censorship, print media remain the first and best 
target for activists seeking to valorize the censored. Few 
journalists who cover controversial subjects - and 
censorship is always controversial - have escaped the blue 
pencils of excessive editorial caution or the nagging regrets 
of self-censorship. Almost all seasoned journalists have had 
stories killed or have had to abandon promising leads 
because of management's fears of lawsuits or adverse effects 
on advertising revenues. Journalists are therefore generally 
sympathetic to the plight of others who are subjected to the 
knife of censorship; and this solidarity is especially strong 
when the censored are fellow writers. That is, journalists are 
likely to frame them as 'victims' of oppressive states, 
ruthless corporations, or reactionary clerics. Cases of 
censorship resonate closely with what Peter Hamill (1998) 
describes as the romantic tradition in journalism: the 
identification with the underdog pitted against powerful but 
corrupt forces in heroic struggles for justice. 
Conversely, the framing conventions of news writing 
conventionally categorize demonstrations or protests as 
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public disturbances; therefore, crime reporters are typically 
assigned to cover these events (Gitlin, 1980). Protest actions 
are therefore likely to be covered, if they are covered at all, 
using the same narrative formulas as crime coverage. Crime 
reporting relies very heavily on official sources for 
information, e.g. the police, and other representatives of 
established authority. As lawbreakers, perpetrators are not 
considered credible sources by journalists; their side of the 
story is not typically reported. The views of protesters are 
also typically framed as deviant views by crime reporters, 
and rarely given a full or fair hearing. A similar dynamic 
applies to whistleblowers. Like crime reporters, business 
writers routinely rely on corporate sources (managers, 
public relations personnel, etc.) for information. They do not 
want to jeopardize their future access to information by 
writing damaging stories about their sources. In the case of 
whistleblowers, there are also legal liabilities. Corporations 
will typically threaten lawsuits against newspapers and 
individual reporters if they publish damaging information 
even if the information is true. For many newspapers the 
threat is enough to kill the story. Journalists learn not to 
waste time on stories that have little probability of making it 
into print or onto the air. Moreover, journalists, by the very 
nature of their craft, are expected to be "team-players:" that 
is, news production is an organizational process that 
requires cooperation, collegiality, and at least minimal 
levels of trust. Whistleblowers are, however, always 
surrounded by a cloud of suspicion: employers will claim 
they are disloyal, dishonest, self-seeking, and unreliable, all 
vices abhorred by the professional ideology of journalism. 
So, where a censored writer is a natural ally, a 
whistleblower - even a whistleblower who serves a high 
moral cause - is at best a suspicious character who has to 
work very hard to achieve credibility with journalists and 
other defenders of the oppressed. 
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